"God and Subjectivity" is an essentially metaphysical monograph, but one that is cast in an historical mode: it reports on first philosophy as a biography of the concept of being. Its thesis is that St. Anselm's notion of God provided a "pivot" on which philosophy turned from the Aristotelian conception of substance as the object of -first philosophy- to Descartes' conception of the subject as the ground of -science-. The changeover is not new, of course, but Anselm as the catalyst (...) is; and an effort is made to present his role in the development with as much textual support and sustained argument as possible. Even Feuerbach appears, in this light, as a kind of inversion of the Anselmian argument.". (shrink)

Gerald J. Galgan's collection of essays speaks in several philosophical voices. He explores the relationship between a metaphysical and epistemological language and follows the transition from the medieval Christian Book of Nature to the modern conception of subjectivity.

The consumerist elevation of wants into needs requires the elevation of ethical relativism into the status of a "dogma." Collectivism and individualism are the two faces of this dogma and require the uneasy mediation of the claims of utilitarianism and romanticism. The historical and philosophical backdrop for this mediation is suggested with reference to Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, J.S. Mill, De Tocqueville, and Oakeshott.

Kolb's purpose is to dispel a practical and theoretical illusion--promoted by modernity about its own uniqueness as a unified and unifying constellation of meanings which wholly defines us--and to put modernity "in its place" within that sustaining and limiting context which makes it possible, which cannot be described in "standard modern terms," and which suggests that we are not as free as--and yet more than what--modernity says we are. He begins with an examination of the "standard self-description of modernity and (...) its basic dichotomies and divisions," in particular the modern preference for formal over substantive rationality, emphasized by Max Weber in his presentation of modern society as "a process waiting for content to come from the choice of its citizens"--the modern self relating "to itself and to others as a pure chooser, with no necessary substantive content". (shrink)

Caught in a dilemma-namely, the decontextualization and negation of its early interpretive schematism which served as the sole ground for a free society--modernity is presently losing its legitimacy, its fidelity to individual freedom, the "core of nondialectical humanism," which Cahoone attempts to isolate. In part 1, he argues that the "self-negating strain" of modern philosophical activity is a "methodological or systematic dualism" endemic to "subjectivism," viz., the belief that the distinction between the non-subjective and the subjective is fundamental for any (...) investigation. The claim that the individual thinking subject is the nucleus of all value within the parameters of the finite world could only be viable in combination with "transcendental" claims which were articulated largely in the "theological firmament" of seventeenth-century methodology, epistemology, and metaphysics, and were impeached in the nineteenth century. "Non-transcendental subjectivism" differs from early modern objectivity and subjectivity, for when the self becomes entirely "worldless," devoid of mediation of the transcendent, it is no longer possible to think of objectivity and subjectivity as independent and yet interrelated, and there begins the movement toward "philosophical narcissism". Denuding the subject of all capacities except its "natural" inclinations toward consciousness of material objectivity and its instrumental rational mastery, philosophical narcissism rejects any notion of "transcendental vehicles of relatedness" which are beyond the division into objective and subjective spheres, so that either the non-subjective must absorb the subjective or vice versa. (shrink)

Gavin argues that the restoration of "the vague and inarticulate" to its proper place in experience is vital for James's texts. In the first part, "Interpretations," he shows how religious concerns led to the metaphysical notion of "reality as vague." In line with the "unfinished" Jamesian text, the second part offers "Conversations" with texts of Peirce, Dewey, Marx, Rorty, and Derrida. The third, "Applications," true to the "directional" thrust of James's text, puts that text to work in modern art and (...) medicine. (shrink)